Stocking the genetic supermarket: reproductive genetic technologies and collective action problems by Gyngell, Chris & Douglas, Thomas
STOCKING THE GENETIC SUPERMARKET: REPRODUCTIVE GENETIC
TECHNOLOGIES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
CHRIS GYNGELL AND THOMAS DOUGLAS
Keywords
enhancement,
genetics,
reproduction,
collective action problems,
genetic selection
ABSTRACT
Reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs) allow parents to decide whether
their future children will have or lack certain genetic predispositions. A
popular model that has been proposed for regulating access to RGTs is the
‘genetic supermarket’. In the genetic supermarket, parents are free to make
decisions about which genes to select for their children with little state
interference. One possible consequence of the genetic supermarket is that
collective action problems will arise: if rational individuals use the genetic
supermarket in isolation from one another, this may have a negative effect
on society as a whole, including future generations. In this article we argue
that RGTs targeting height, innate immunity, and certain cognitive traits
could lead to collective action problems. We then discuss whether this risk
could in principle justify state intervention in the genetic supermarket. We
argue that there is a plausible prima facie case for the view that such state
intervention would be justified and respond to a number of arguments that
might be adduced against that view.
Various technologies already exist that enable parents to
determine whether their future children will have or lack
certain genetic predispositions. Pre-natal testing and
selective abortion allow parents to decide whether to con-
tinue with a particular pregnancy based on genetic infor-
mation about the developing embryo or foetus. In vitro
fertilization (IVF) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD) allow parents to acquire genetic information
about a range of embryos and then determine which to
gestate on the basis of that information. In the future it
may become possible for parents employing assisted
reproductive technologies to decide which eggs to fertilize
with which sperm on the basis of reliable genetic infor-
mation about the available eggs and sperm.1 Advances in
genetic engineering technologies could also allow parents
to directly alter the genes of existing sperm, eggs,
embryos or foetuses.
We use the term ‘reproductive genetic technologies’ or
‘RGTs’ to refer collectively to these technologies and to
any other technologies that enable parents or others to (i)
determine which of different possible future children to
bring into existence based on detailed information about
their likely genetic make-up, or (ii) alter the genetic
make-up of a given future child whom the parents intend
to bring into existence.2
There are at least two important questions that might
be asked about RGTs. First, given the availability of
specific RGTs, how ought parents to use them? That is –
what are the obligations of parents with regard to using
the RGTs that are available?3 Second, given the technical
feasibility of specific RGTs, which should be made
1 This possibility seems likely to occur in the very near future. Personal
genomics Company ‘23andMe’ recently received a patent to a technol-
ogy called ‘Gamete Donor Selection Based on Genetic Calculations’
(US patent: us 8,543,339). Technologies such as this would allow indi-
viduals to choose between sperm or egg donors based on the statistical
likelihood of the resulting child having a certain phonotype.
2 We understand ‘child’ to mean ‘post-natal child’. Thus, for us, a child
comes into existence at the time of its birth. We suspect that much of
what we say would also bear on practices that influence the capacities or
genetic material of existing children and adults, but we do not discuss
such practices here.
3 Various principles have been offered in response to this first question.
See, for example, J. Robertson. Children of Choice: Freedom and the
New Reproductive Technologies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994; S. Shiffrin. Wrongful life, procreative responsibility, and
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available to prospective parents? That is – how ought
governments, or other regulatory bodies, to provide and
regulate access to RGTs?
A popular class of responses to the second question
come under the banner of ‘liberal eugenics’.4 Liberal
eugenic approaches stress the importance of parental
autonomy, and support widespread access to RGTs. One
of the earliest descriptions of such an approach is found
in Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Nozick
advocates a ‘genetic supermarket’:5
Consider . . . the issue of genetic engineering. Many
biologists tend to think the problem is one of design, of
specifying the best types of persons so that biologists
can proceed to produce them. Thus they worry over
what sort(s) of person there is to be and who will
control this process. They do not tend to think,
perhaps because it diminishes the importance of their
role, of a system in which they run a ‘genetic supermar-
ket’, meeting the individual specifications (within
certain moral limits) of prospective parents . . . This
supermarket system has the great virtue that it involves
no centralized decision fixing the future of human
type(s).
The core idea of the genetic supermarket, and of liberal
eugenics, is that RGTs are freely available to prospective
parents, who are ultimately responsible for making selec-
tion decisions about the children. This model for regulat-
ing access to RGTs can be contrasted with older eugenic
practices, which involved coercing people into certain
reproductive choices, and current regulations governing
access to embryo screening technologies, which in many
jurisdictions restrict the use of RGTs to the prevention of
diseases, or a sub-class of diseases.6
Most writers in the liberal eugenic tradition accept
there should be some limits placed on parental use of
RGTs. The genetic supermarket should not be a true free
market. However, they take a true free market to be the
default position, with any deviation from it requiring a
justification.
There is disagreement about precisely how much devia-
tion from a true free market is justified. Some writers
argue that it is only permissible to interfere with parental
choice to protect the children who are targets of these
technologies.7 Others argue that it may also be permissi-
ble to interfere with parental choice to promote social
goals like equality, and to protect the public interest.8
One way in which the ‘public interest’ could be harmed
as a result of widespread use of RGTs is through the
effect of collective action problems. We will take it that a
collective action problem exists whenever rational indi-
vidual agents acting in isolation from one another collec-
tively have a negative effect on wider society.9
Many writers have pointed to the fact that collective
action problems could potentially arise for some traits
targeted by RGTs, and have claimed that this would
potentially justify restricting access to these technolo-
gies.10 However, so far this discussion has mainly
focussed on only one collective action problem: that
posed by RGTs targeting height. The broader signifi-
cance of collective action problems for the regulation of
RGTs has not been investigated.
In this article we assess the likelihood and significance
of several collective action problems that could arise in a
genetic supermarket. In Part 1, we consider whether and
to what extent collective action problems are likely to
arise for RGTs targeting height, innate immunity and
particular cognitive traits. We argue that collective action
problems could arise in all three areas, with different
factors affecting their extent and scope. Thus, we suggest,
the concern about collective action problems is a serious
one. In Part 2, we argue that if the availability of particu-
lar RGTs did result in collective action problems, then it
would be appropriate for the state to restrict access to
them in certain circumstances. We conclude by discussing
the implications of our arguments for debates regarding
the appropriate framework for regulating RGTs.
the significance of harm. Legal Theory 1999; 5: 117–148; J. Savulescu.
Procreative beneficence: Why we should select the best children. Bioeth-
ics 2001; 15: 413–426; E. Harman. Can we harm and benefit in creating?
Philosophical Perspectives 2004; 18: 89–113; J. Elster. Procreative
beneficence – Cui bono? Bioethics 2011; 25: 482–488; T. Douglas &
K. Devolder. Procreative altruism: Beyond individualism in reproduc-
tive selection. J Med Philos 2013; 38: 400–419.
4 See, for example, N. Agar. Liberal Eugenics. Public Aff Q 1998; 12:
137–155; A Buchanan et al. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and
Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2001; N. Agar.
Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement. Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing; 2004; J. Harris. Enhancing evolution: the ethical
case for making better people. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University
Press; 2007; J. Glover. Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design.
Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2008; P. Singer. Parental Choice and
Human Improvement. In: Human Enhancement. J. Savulescu, N.
Bostrom, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2009. pp. 277–289.
5 R. Nozick. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books; 1974.
p. 315.
6 Another practice that is often allowed under current regulations is the
selection of embryos on the basis of their suitability to act as a tissue
donor for a sick sibling. Children who are born through this process are
often referred to as ‘saviour siblings’. For discussion, see M. Spriggs &
J. Savulescu. Saviour siblings. J Med Ethics 2002; 28(5): 289–289. We
thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
7 R. Bailey. Liberation Biology: The Scientific and Moral Case for the
Biotech Revolution. Amherst: Prometheus Books; 2005.
8 Buchanan et al., op. cit. note 4, pp. 16–17 & 183. Glover, op. cit. note
4, pp. 77–79.
9 We understand ‘wider society’ to include both current and present
individuals, and both individuals who contribute to the problem and
those who do not. Economic definitions of collective action problems
are frequently somewhat narrower than ours, but we believe that our
definition captures how the concept has been used in discussions of
RGTs.
10 Buchanan et al., op. cit. note 4, pp. 182–187; Singer, op. cit. note 4.
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1. COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
The idea that collective action problems could potentially
result from widespread access to particular RGTs has
been suggested by many authors. For example, Singer
says that:11
being able to select for height. . . . could start the
human equivalent of the peacock’s tail – an escalating
‘height race’ in which the height that distinguishes ‘tall’
people from those who are ‘normal’ increases year by
year, to no one’s benefit, at considerable environmental
cost, and perhaps eventually even at some health cost
to the children themselves. Genetic enhancement could
lead to a collective action problem, in which the
rational pursuit of individual self-interest makes us all
worse off.
In this section we will examine the significance of the
collective action problem presented by RGTs targeting
height. We will also discuss two other types of RGTs that
could potentially result in collective action problems that
have not previously been discussed in the literature –
RGTs that target innate immunity and those targeting
certain cognitive traits.12 We assume throughout that
rational parents faced with decisions about how to use
RGTs would be motivated by the wellbeing of their
future child.13 That is, if choosing between different pos-
sible future children, they would choose to have a child
who can be expected to have a life containing more well-
being over a child who can be expected to have a life
containing less wellbeing, and if choosing what disposi-
tions to bring about in a given future child, they would
choose to bring about dispositions that can be expected
to give the future child more rather than less wellbeing.14
The collective action problems we discuss arise when
individual couples or single parents use RGTs in ways
that are expectedly best for their children, but where
parents as a collective act in a way that is bad for all of
their children. No individual couple or single parent
could make their future child expectedly better off by
acting differently, but if all parents acted differently, all of
their children would be expectedly better off.15
1.1 Height
The idea that RGTs targeting height would lead to a
collective action problem builds on empirical research
suggesting that tall people perform better on a range of
measures thought relevant to wellbeing. Tall people have
been found to be more attractive to the opposite sex and
more likely to have a long-term partner.16 Tall people also
make more money, even when factors like level of educa-
tion are controlled for. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then,
height has been found to be correlated with subjective
wellbeing.17 If RGTs which target height were available in
the genetic supermarket we might expect rational parents
to use these RGTs to attempt to have taller children.18
However, if every parent used RGTs to have taller
children, this would negate any positive effect of the addi-
tional height on wellbeing. This is because everyone’s
relative height would stay more or less the same, and it is
relative height rather than absolute height that is associ-
ated with increased career and relationship success and
subjective happiness. Further, there are ways in which the
widespread provision of height enhancements would
make everyone worse off. Buchanan and co-authors note
that even if the means of height enhancement had no
direct negative health consequences for the enhanced
individual, such enhancements would nevertheless have
costs, including the economic costs of the intervention
11 Singer, op. cit. note 4, pp. 282–283.
12 Widespread access to sex selection technologies may also result in
collective action problems in certain parts of the world. If it is in an
individual’s best interest to be a particular sex because of certain social
conditions, the widespread availability RGTs targeting sex may make
everyone worse off by causing a large imbalance in the sex ratio. We
have chosen not to discuss this particular collective action problem in
detail because the likelihood that it will arise and its significance if it
does arise differ substantially between different societies. For further
discussion see Buchanan et al., op. cit. note 4, pp. 183–184; and R.
Sparrow. Human enhancement and sexual dimorphism. Bioethics.
2012; 26: 464–475.
13 In this context we use the term ‘future child’ to refer to the next child
the parents will have, even if the parents are using technologies which
change the identity of that child, such as pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis.
14 We thus effectively assume that rational parents would maximize the
wellbeing of their children given the possibilities open to them.
However, our subsequent arguments would not be affected if instead
they would only aim for a high, but not necessarily maximal, level of
wellbeing.
15 Although all the collective action problems we discuss are ones in
which parents act in ways that are expectedly best for their children, in
some cases parents may use RGTs in ways that actually end up making
their children individually worse off because things do not turn out as
expected. The collection action problem arising from RGT’s targeting
innate immunity, discussed below, takes this form.
16 D. Nettle. Women’s height, reproductive success and the evolution of
sexual dimorphism in modern humans. Proc Biol Sci 2002; 269: 1919–
1923.
17 A. Deaton & R. Arora. Life at the top: The benefits of height. Econ
Hum Biol 2009; 7: 133–136.
18 Of course, insofar as parents are limited to selecting between embryos
created using existing in vitro fertilization techniques, they will be
severely constrained in the extent to which they can influence the height,
or other traits, of their offspring. This is because these techniques allow
for the creation of only a small number of embryos. However, it is
possible that these constraints will be weakened in the future through
the development of genetic modification techniques or stem cell tech-
niques that would enable the creation of eggs and sperm in vitro. For
discussion of the latter possibility, see H. Bourne, T. Douglas & J.
Savulescu. Procreative Beneficence and in Vitro Gametogenesis.
Monash Bioeth Rev 2012; 30: 29–48; and R. Sparrow. In Vitro Eugenics.
J Med Ethics. Forthcoming.
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itself and the costs of redesigning our buildings, vehicles
and environment more generally to accommodate taller
individuals.19 There may also be other environmental
costs associated with height enhancements. In general tall
people need to eat more food, require more fuel to travel,
and consume more resources than shorter people. The
creation of taller people could increase carbon emissions
and increase the risk of dangerous climate change.
Indeed, in a recent article, S. Matthew Liao and
co-authors argue that, if we wish to use RGTs to protect
our populations against climate change, we should
already be aiming to make future people shorter than
we are.20
Despite these costs, however, rational parents could be
expected to use RGTs to have taller children. If other
parents use RGTs to target height and you do not, your
child will end up enduring a significant height-related
disadvantage. On the other hand, if other parents do not
use RGTs in this way, and you do, your child will enjoy
a significant wellbeing advantage. Thus, regardless of
what other parents do, if you are motivated by the well-
being of your own future child, you will attempt to use
RGTs to have taller children. The fact that choosing to
have a taller child may also contribute to social and envi-
ronmental costs of the sort mentioned above is unlikely
to be a decisive consideration for parents motivated
solely by the wellbeing of their future child, since most of
those costs will be borne by others. In theory then, the
availability of RGTs which target height in the genetic
supermarket would create a collective action problem.
The rational actions of individuals in the market would
make everyone worse off.
However the problem may not be as significant as it is
sometimes presented. For one, the relationship between
height and subjective wellbeing is strongly affected by
sex. Only in males is height independently correlated with
increases in wellbeing, once economic and health impacts
are controlled for.21 Taller women are happier only
because they are, on average, healthier and earn more
money. The association between height and wellbeing in
women may therefore be better explained by factors
which cause both tallness and elevated wellbeing rather
than a direct relationship between height and wellbeing.
Malnourishment in childhood, for example, may lead to
individuals being shorter as adults, and may also prevent
them from reaching their full cognitive potential. This
could contribute to worse educational outcomes and
earnings in adulthood.22 Consequently, we might expect
that direct height enhancements would be more popular
among parents of male children than female children.
Further, at very extreme heights it is doubtful whether
further height increases will be associated with increases
in wellbeing. Being extremely tall has health and social
costs. At extreme heights individuals can find it difficult
to attract romantic partners.23 Being very tall can lead to
cardiovascular problems, because of the increased load
on the heart to supply the body with blood. It can also
lead to problems resulting from the increased time it takes
the brain to communicate with the extremities. If humans
were to get taller and taller, at some point any relative
height advantage would surely be outweighed by these
costs.
Therefore, while widespread access to height enhance-
ments will potentially lead to a collective action problem,
this problem might be somewhat limited in scope (due to
the fact that height does not appear to confer a wellbeing
advantage on women) and in magnitude (due to the fact
that increasing height is likely to cause a net loss of well-
being at some point).
1.2 Innate immunity
The widespread availability of RGTs capable of targeting
innate immunity could also lead to collective action prob-
lems. In a genetic supermarket some immune system
genes may be more desirable than others, as they provide
protection against the likeliest disease threats. However,
if many parents pick the same immune system genes for
their children, their combined actions may reduce popu-
lation level immunodiversity, and this could make every-
one worse off.
Some genes provide protection against some diseases
but increase susceptibility to others. For example, it is
known that a variant of the DARC gene – which codes
for an antigen found on red blood cells – provides pro-
tection against malaria. However this version of the gene
also disposes people to be more susceptible to human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV).24 Genes like this could
potentially lead to collective action problems, as it may be
best for any given individual to have one variant, but best
for the overall wellbeing of the population for there to be
a mixture of the two variants in the population. For
example, imagine a population in which the average inci-
dence of malaria is 3% and the incidence of HIV is 5%,
and assume that it is at least as bad to have HIV as to
have malaria. If everyone chose the version of the gene
that was expectably best for their children, they would
pick the version of the gene which provided protection
19 Buchanan et al., op. cit. note 4, p. 186.
20 S.M. Liao et al. Human Engineering and Climate Change. Eth Pol
Envir 2012; 15: 206–221.
21 V. Carrieri & M. De Paola. Height and subjective well-being in Italy.
Econ Hum Biol 2012; 10: 289–298.
22 A. Case & C. Paxson. Stature and Status: Height, Ability, and Labor
Market Outcomes. J Poliy Econ 2008; 116(3): 499–532.
23 Nettle, op. cit. note 16.
24 W. He et al. Duffy antigen receptor for chemokines mediates trans-
infection of HIV-1 from red blood cells to target cells and affects HIV-
AIDS susceptibility. Cell Host Microbe 2008; 4: 52–62.
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against HIV. However this could make the population as
a whole worse off. If a mixture of genes were present in
the population, this might ensure that any epidemics of
HIV or malaria would be only moderately severe.
However, if everyone had the gene that protects against
HIV and leaves them susceptible to the malaria virus, the
result could be that malaria epidemics would tend to be
very severe. Even if there were a corresponding reduction
in the severity of HIV epidemics, this could be a negative
outcome overall. Severe epidemics may be particularly
undesirable as they result in many people being sick
simultaneously, which can disrupt the supply of essential
goods and services. This can lead to worse outcomes for
those directly affected by an illness as well as the broader
population. For example, as the supply of health services
can be disrupted, sick individuals may have trouble
getting properly diagnosed and treated. Similarly, as the
supply of other essential goods can be disrupted, severe
epidemics can have negative flow-on effects for healthy
individuals. Therefore, in cases such as these, it may be
preferable for a population to maintain a certain amount
of genetic diversity. Diversity would reduce the likelihood
that a significant portion of the population would become
sick at the one time.
Other immune genes have known benefits but may also
have costs that are yet to be discovered. These genes
could also pose collective action problems if available in
a genetic supermarket. For example, the CCR5 gene
codes for a type of receptor found on macrophages (a
type of white blood cell), which are targeted by the HIV
virus. One form of the CCR5 gene provides resistance to
the HIV virus.25 However, given the important role
played by macrophage receptors in fighting other infec-
tions, it is possible that individuals with this form of the
gene will be more susceptible to other infectious agents
that are yet to evolve. If this gene were available in a
genetic supermarket it seems plausible that many parents
would select the form of the gene which provides resist-
ance to HIV. This is likely to be the case even in popula-
tions where HIV is only a minor threat. But the combined
result of many people selecting this gene for their children
may be bad for those populations as a whole, as it may
increase their susceptibility to future epidemics.
This problem could be exacerbated if many different
immune genes could be targeted by RGTs. If parents
make many similar decisions across a range of immune
genes, a significant reduction in the general immune-
diversity of a population may result. This general reduc-
tion in genetic diversity could make these populations
prone to being devastated, and even wiped out, by novel
disease threats.
Of course, it might be thought that, while in theory
RGTs that target immunity will result in collective action
problems, the ability of a human population to fight
disease in other ways may render these problems insig-
nificant by the time a genetic supermarket opens. Vac-
cines and antibiotics can already mitigate many infectious
disease threats, and in the future other technologies may
make innate immunity even less important than it is now.
However, it is difficult to be confident that innate immu-
nity will be less important in the future. Antibiotic resist-
ance is becoming a major issue and if it continues we may
even find that innate immunity will be more important
for the population than it is now.
1.3 Cognitive traits
RGTs targeting certain cognitive traits could also lead to
collective action problems.26 Some cognition-related
genes may be very popular in an unregulated genetic
supermarket. However, the combined action of many
parents choosing these genes for their children may
reduce valuable types of cognitive diversity and make
everyone worse off.
Recent work in social science has demonstrated that
when groups of people are solving complex problems,
cognitive diversity can matter more than individual
ability.27 Cognitive diversity in this sense refers to differ-
ences in how each ‘individual sees the world, interprets its
problems, and makes predictions in it’.28 Groups with low
levels of cognitive diversity tend to get stuck on sub-
optimal solutions when attempting to solve complex
problems together. Because individuals in these groups
have similar ways of approaching the problem, they will
not be able to see the whole range of potential solutions
available. In contrast, when cognitively diverse groups
are solving problems together, they can assess more
potential solutions, meaning they are more likely to find
optimal solutions to problems.29 This model is supported
25 M. Samson et al. Resistance to HIV-1 infection in caucasian indi-
viduals bearing mutant alleles of the CCR-5 chemokine receptor gene.
Nature 1996; 382: 722–725.
26 Many cognitive traits are significantly influenced by genetic factors.
For example, degree of extroversion and risk of depression both have
high heritability, indicating that a significant amount of the variation
observed in these traits can be explained by genetic differences (see T.J.
Bouchard, M. McGue. Genetic and environmental influences on human
psychological differences. J Neurobiol 2003; 54: 4–45). This suggests a
range of cognitive traits could potentially be targeted by RGTs.
27 L. Hong & S.E. Page. Groups of diverse problem solvers can out-
perform groups of high-ability problem solvers. Proc Natl Acad Sci
USA 2004; 101: 16385–16389; S.E. Page. The Difference: How the Power
of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press; 2008.
28 H. Landemore. Deliberation, cognitive diversity, and democratic
inclusiveness: an epistemic argument for the random selection of repre-
sentatives. Synthese 2013; 190: 1209–1231.
29 How much cognitive diversity is beneficial for a particular group will
depend on the problem the group is trying to solve. For simple problems
only very low levels of cognitive diversity may be needed. For more
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by data showing that cognitively diverse teams outper-
form less diverse teams on measures of problem solving.30
If this model is accurate, cognitive diversity may influ-
ence the collective wellbeing of a society. Cognitive diver-
sity makes groups of people better at solving problems,
and populations benefit from this. Reducing cognitive
diversity could potentially have very significant long-term
effects on future generations, as it could diminish soci-
ety’s ability to deal with complex global problems like
climate change.
In many circumstances we would not expect all
rational parents to pick the same cognition targeted genes
for their children, and so cognitive diversity might not be
significantly reduced by the availability of RGTs that
affect cognition. Generally, rational individuals have
many diverse preferences, and so we may expect them to
make diverse choices regarding which cognition-affecting
genes they pick for their children. However some prefer-
ences may be very widely shared by many parents. For
instance, it seems plausible that most parents want their
children to be happy. Studies indicate that parents gen-
erally prefer teachers that make their children happy over
ones that increase their academic performance.31 There-
fore, if some genes make it more likely children will be
happy we may expect many rational parents to select
them for their children. If this has the effect of lowering a
valuable type of cognitive diversity, it may make every-
one worse off.
Consider genes that predispose individuals to depres-
sion. Being prone to depression can make someone’s life
harder and less enjoyable. This may mean that, in a
genetic supermarket, rational individuals would select
against genes that predispose to depression. However,
these genes may also contribute to valuable cognitive
skills. For example, people who are predisposed to
depression have been shown to have increased analytic
skills.32 Research also suggests that people who are
depressed use different heuristics to solve problems from
those used by people who are not depressed.33 The exist-
ence of individuals on the depressive spectrum, then,
could constitute a valuable type of cognitive diversity –
one that contributes to collective wellbeing.34
Another example of a cognitive trait that may influence
happiness is extroversion. A variety of studies have
linked being extroverted to increased levels of subjective
wellbeing.35 This means that if RGTs were available
which targeted extroversion, we may expect rational
parents who value happiness for their children to take
steps to increase their chance of having an extroverted
child. If many parents did this, it would have the effect of
reducing the population level diversity of this trait. But
this could also be bad for the population as a whole.
Studies indicate that introverts and extroverts have dif-
ferences in brain structure,36 and respond differently to
stimuli.37 It’s plausible that this contributes to distinctive
perspectives and heuristics and represents a valuable type
of cognitive diversity.
The widespread availability of RGTs targeting extro-
version and depression may, therefore, pose a collective
action problem. It may be rational for parents who value
happiness to use the RGTs to select against genes that
predispose individuals to depression and introversion.
But this could be detrimental for the population as a
whole because it reduces a valuable kind of cognitive
diversity.
2. COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE
In the previous section, we looked at some collective
action problems that may arise in a genetic supermarket.
We argued that the availability of RGTs that target
height, immunity and aspects of cognition could result in
collective action problems. At least in the case of immu-
nity and cognitive traits, and possibly also in the case of
height, it is plausible that these problems would have
significant effects on society and future generations,
though of course any predictions about the likely
scope and extent of such problems are necessarily highly
uncertain.
In this section we will focus on ethical and political
issues rather than empirical ones. If a particular RGT did
complex problems groups will benefit from much higher levels of cog-
nitive diversity (although there will still be an upper limit above which
extra diversity is no longer beneficial). See Page, op cit. note 27, pp.
158–159.
30 Page, op cit. note 27; L.L. Martins et al. A Contingency View of the
Effects of Cognitive Diversity on Team Performance: The Moderating
Roles of Team Psychological Safety and Relationship Conflict. Small
Gr Res 2013; 44: 96–126.
31 B.A. Jacob & L. Lefgren. What Do Parents Value in Education? An
Empirical Investigation of Parents’ Revealed Preferences for Teachers.
Q J Econ 2007; 122: 1603–1637.
32 P.W. Andrews & J.A. Thomson Jr. The bright side of being blue:
depression as an adaptation for analyzing complex problems. Psychol
Rev 2009; 116: 620–654.
33 R. Greifeneder & H. Bless. Depression and reliance on ease-of-
retrieval experiences. Eur J Soc Psychol 2008; 38: 213–230.
34 It should be noted that the arguments presented here could also apply
to other treatments for depression, such as the use of antidepressants.
These could also reduce the types of cognitive diversity discussed here
and thus result in collective action problems. We thank an anonymous
reviewer for suggesting this possibility.
35 C.R. Gale et al. Neuroticism and Extraversion in Youth Predict
Mental Wellbeing and Life Satisfaction 40 Years Later. J Res Pers 2013;
47: 687–697.
36 D.W. Johnson et al. Cerebral Blood Flow and Personality: A Posi-
tron Emission Tomography Study. Am J Psychiatry 1999; 156: 252–257.
37 L.D. Smillie et al. Do extraverts get more bang for the buck? Refining
the affective-reactivity hypothesis of extraversion. J Pers Soc Psychol
2012; 103: 306–326.
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lead to a collective action problem, should that influence
whether the state restricts access to it?
Some would argue that there is a strong case for state
interference in a market to prevent collective action prob-
lems. The presence of a collective action problem can be
seen as a type of market failure, which some take to be a
ground for state intervention.38 This suggests that some
would think the state could be justified in intervening in a
genetic supermarket in order to prevent collective action
problems. This view is prima facie quite plausible. It is
plausible that moral agents, including the state, have
moral reasons to promote and not to set back human
wellbeing, and collective action problems of the sort that
we have discussed would tend to reduce overall human
wellbeing. On this view, then, the state would have moral
reasons to prevent those problems from occurring.
However some influential moral views imply that these
reasons are illusory or at least are outweighed by other
considerations. It may be claimed either that no state
involvement at all in the genetic supermarket is appropri-
ate, or that the state should only intervene in the market
to prevent imminent and substantial harm to individuals.
We consider these views in turn below.
2.1 A laissez faire approach
Perhaps the genetic supermarket should be a true ‘free
market’ to which no state restrictions apply. The most
promising argument for this view would, we think, appeal
to the view that parents have a right to determine the
genetic characteristics of their children. This view might
(though need not) be advanced within an entitlement-
based theory of justice such as that advanced by Robert
Nozick.39 If parents enjoy a right of this kind, then state
intervention in the genetic supermarket would be imper-
missible, or at least presumptively impermissible, depend-
ing on what view one takes regarding the normative
strength of rights.
A difficulty with this approach, however, is that it is
very doubtful whether parents do enjoy a right of the
relevant sort. It is often claimed that people have a right
to self-ownership and it might, perhaps, follow from this
that they have a right to determine their own genetic
characteristics, insofar as this is possible. But it is doubt-
ful whether this right extends to one’s children who are
not part of one’s own self. Alternatively it might be
claimed that parents have rights to determine the genetic
characteristics of their offspring because children are the
external property of their parents, and parents have a
right to shape the characteristics of their external prop-
erty. But children do not seem to fall under property
rights of the sort that cover external possessions; we do
not, for example, think that parents are free to sell, rent
or destroy their children as we would were children exter-
nal property of the ordinary sort. It seems doubtful, then,
that an appeal to property rights could support a right to
determine the genetic characteristics of one’s children.
Rather than that attempting to derive a right to deter-
mine the genetic characteristics of one’s children from a
more general class of property rights, one might attempt
to derive it from a more general right to shape the char-
acteristics of one’s children. It is true that parents are
normally permitted to exert considerable influence over
the traits of their children by, for example, choosing what
sort of parenting style to adopt and choosing what kinds
of educational and recreational opportunities to present
to their children. It might be argued that we allow parents
such great freedom in these areas because we take them to
have a right to shape the traits of their child, and this
right might be thought to include a right to determine,
prior to birth, the child’s genetic characteristics.
However, most people would accept that there should
be significant constraints on how parents raise their chil-
dren. For example, compulsory elementary education is
widely accepted, so is the idea that the state may intervene
with parental freedom in cases of child neglect or where
parents are, for example, encouraging seriously anti-social
behaviour in their children. Insofar as widely held views on
parenting support a right to determine the characteristics
of one’s children, and thus to determine the genetic char-
acteristics of one’s future children, they support only a
rather constrained right. It is therefore difficult to see how
an appeal to such views could support an unconstrained
right of the sort that would be necessary to support an
unregulated genetic supermarket approach to RGTs.
2.2 The ‘real and present’ harms requirement
Rather than a true free market, perhaps the genetic super-
market should be one in which the standard for state
intervention is set very high, so that it precludes interfer-
ence to prevent collective action problems, though it may
allow state intervention for other reasons. John Harris
suggests a view that might have this implication. He
states that, for restrictions on access to reproductive tech-
nologies to be justified, it must be the case that the use of
those technologies would be
seriously harmful to others or to society and that these
harms are real and present, not future and speculative,
for if they were not, the presumption in favour of
liberty would be at risk whenever imaginative tyrants
could postulate possible, but highly unlikely, future
harms.4038 For example see N. Stern. The Stern Review on the Economic Effects
of Climate Change. Popul Dev Rev 2006; 32: 793–798.
39 Nozick, op. cit. note 5. 40 Harris, op. cit. note 4, p. 74.
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It might be argued that the sorts of harms caused by
creating collective action problems do not satisfy this
requirement. However, it is unclear what Harris means
by his requirement that harms be ‘real and present, not
future and speculative’.41 The requirement may seem to
rule out, as grounds for state intervention, all harms that
will not occur immediately, or at least in the short-term
future. But if so, the requirement will be implausible. In
general, the fact that a harm will occur some distance into
the future does not undermine the case for state interven-
tion. For example, a government could clearly be justified
in preventing a parent from feeding a poison to his child,
even if that poison would only cause harm to the child
years down the line.
This suggests that we should focus not on Harris’s
distinction between ‘present’ and ‘future’ harms, but on
his distinction between ‘real’ and ‘speculative’ harms.
There are different ways in which we might interpret this
distinction. On one interpretation, a harm qualifies as
‘real’ if and only if there is some non-negligible probabil-
ity of it occurring: entirely fantastic harms do not warrant
state intervention, but harms could nevertheless be highly
unlikely and still warrant government intervention. This
view would certainly not rule out collective action prob-
lems of the kinds we have described as grounds for state
intervention, since the probability that such problems will
occur is not negligible. However, it is doubtful that Harris
intends to set the threshold for ‘real’ harms so low, for he
describes the ‘real and present harm’ condition as a ‘high
standard’.42 He also at times replaces talk of ‘real and
present’ harms with talk of ‘real, present, and highly
probable’ harms.43
This suggests that Harris rather has in mind that a
harm would qualify as ‘real’ only if there is a high prob-
ability that the harm will occur. Harris would then be
claiming that only harms with a high probability justify
state intervention. This might seem to exclude considera-
tion of the sorts of harms that we have discussed.
However, on this interpretation, Harris view is implausi-
ble. Surely states are permitted to intervene to prevent
harms that will occur with low probability if those harms
are severe enough. Suppose parents feed their child a
poison that only has an effect in 1% of cases, but that
effect is to cause death. The state would be permitted to
intervene to prevent the administration of this poison.
Perhaps Harris’s ‘real harm’ requirement could be
understood in a different and more plausible way. The
thought might be that a harm will be sufficient to justify
state intervention only if it will occur with a high prob-
ability or would have a high severity. On this view, low
probability harms may justify state intervention, but only
if they have a high degree of severity. This criterion would
seem to preserve Harris’ thought that there should be a
presumption in favour of liberty. However, it is not clear
that this criterion would rule out intervention in the
genetic supermarket to prevent collective action prob-
lems. After all, it is plausible that, for example, uses of
RGTs that significantly reduced diversity of cognitive
traits or immunity would, with at least some significant
probability, cause very severe harms. A reduction in
immune system diversity might, for example, result in a
serious and lethal epidemic that would kill thousands of
people.
Of course, it might be argued that no individual par-
ent’s choice to use an RGT would have made much dif-
ference to the risk that such an epidemic would occur. No
individual parent would have created a significant risk of
a serious harm. However, collectively the parents whose
choices did in fact make it occur would have contributed
to a risk of a very serious harm, and it is difficult to see
why collective actions should be immune to the kind of
state intervention that might be justified in relation to
individual actions which risk serious harm. Imagine a
case like Parfit’s ‘harmless torturers’, in which each of a
1000 individuals pushes a button and the 1000 button-
presses together result in one instance of torture.44
Although no one individual makes a perceptable differ-
ence to pain experienced by the victim in Parfit’s thought
experiment, it would surely be permissible for a govern-
ment to intervene to prevent some (or perhaps all) of the
1000 people from pressing the button. More generally, if
the actions of groups of individuals only together consti-
tute a significant risk of serious harm, it may still be
permissible to restrict the actions of each individual.
Many environmental regulations, for example, such as
those which prohibit the burning of household waste or
the use of inefficient fuels, are intended to prevent (risks
of) environmental harms that would only be severe if
many people engaged in the actions in question. Yet most
would accept that these regulations can be justified.
Are there other grounds, besides those mentioned by
Harris, on which one could argue that the harms pro-
duced by collective action problems would be insufficient
to justify state interference in the genetic supermarket?
One suggestion might be that the harms produced by
collective action problems are insufficient because they
41 We understand the category of harms to include both comparative
harms and noncomparative harms (see, for discussion of this distinc-
tion, J. McMahan. Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives.
J Ethics 2013; 17: 5–35). A person suffers a comparative harm when she
is made worse off than she was previously, or than she would otherwise
have been. A person suffers a noncomparative harm when she exists in
a bad state, and irrespective of how well of she was previously, or would
have been in counterfactual situations. We return to this distinction
later in this section.
42 Harris, op. cit. note 4, p. 72.
43 See for example ibid: 80.
44 D. Parfit. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
1987. p. 79.
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are noncomparative harms.45 The collective action prob-
lems we have discussed may cause significant harms some
way into the future, but genetic decisions that produce
those harms will also affect what people come into exist-
ence in the future. Suppose a large number of people
choose to have children with genes that protect against
HIV, but this leaves future people susceptible to some
new and highly lethal infectious disease 200 years from
now, such that no-one who will actually exist would also
have existed if the genetic selection decisions had not been
made. But suppose those genetic selection decisions will
also influence what people exist 200 years from now. In
that case, arguably no-one would suffer what Jeff
McMahan would call a comparative harm – no-one
would be made worse off than they would otherwise have
been, or than they were previously, by the occurrence of
the epidemic, since the people that it afflicts would not
have existed had the decisions that caused the epidemic
not been made. At most, we could say that those afflicted
by the epidemic suffer a noncomparative harm – the sort
of harm that exists whenever one experiences suffering,
regardless of whether things would have been better for
the individual otherwise, or were better previously.
This suggestion seems unpromising however. For one
thing, it is not clear that noncomparative harms are insuf-
ficient to justify state intervention. Derek Parfit gives the
example of a community which must choose between
risky policy – which would make inhabitants of the com-
munity slightly better for the next century but cause a
catastrophe in three centuries; and safe policy – which
would avoid the catastrophe but make inhabitants
slightly worse off over the next century.46 The choice in
policy would also change which people exist in the future,
so that none of the individuals who would be affected by
the catastrophe in risky policy would exist if the commu-
nity adopted safe policy. By contrast, some of the indi-
viduals who will exist in the next century if safe policy is
adopted would have existed, and been better off, had that
policy not been adopted. Despite the fact that risky policy
would only result in noncomparative harms, while safe
policy would result in some comparative harms, it is
intuitively plausible that that a state would be justified in
choosing safe policy. Similarly we may think that states
are justified in implementing measures that mitigate the
long term risks of climate change, even if these policies
also change which people exist in the future, and there-
fore only prevent noncomparative harms.
Further, it is not clear that all harms produced by the
collective action problems we have discussed would be
noncomparative. Suppose that current selection decisions
regarding immune system or cognitive traits had the
effect of causing future epidemics or slowing the rate of
future scientific progress. Unless those effects took a very
long time to become manifest, some of the people who
experience them will be people who already exist. Those
people would be made (in one way) worse off by these
effects than they would otherwise have been. They would
suffer comparative harms.
Another suggestion might be that the harms produced
by collective action problems would not justify state
intervention in the genetic supermarket because they
would not affect currently identifiable individuals. In
general people have a tendency to give more weight to the
claims of identified individuals than unidentified indi-
viduals. For example, people are more likely to voluntar-
ily contribute money to rescue an identified group of
trapped miners, than they are to voluntarily contribute
money to improve mine safety, which would prevent
more miners whose identities we do not yet know, becom-
ing tapped in the future.47 However whether this general
tendency reflects a morally important distinction is dis-
puted.48 In many cases it seems that harms affecting iden-
tified and unidentified individuals should be considered
as equally important. For example, we think the police
should go to the same lengths to catch a criminal who is
planning on killing a specific individual as they do in
catching one planning on killing a random person.
But even if it were true that states should give harms
affecting identified individuals greater weight than harms
affecting unidentified individuals, it does not follow that
no measures should be taken to prevent collective action
problems in a genetic supermarket. This is because it is
implausible that harms affecting unidentified individuals
should carry no weight at all. If the only way to prevent
the deaths of many unidentified individuals in an armed
attack was to restrict the freedom of one individual to
purchase automated weapons, this would be clearly jus-
tified. Similarly if the risk of harm posed by collective
action problems to unidentified individuals is sufficiently
large, the state would surely be justified in imposing some
restrictions on parents accessing the genetic supermarket
in order to prevent them.
3. CONCLUSION
In this article we have investigated the significance of
some possible collective action problems that could result
from widespread access to RGTs. We claimed that such
problems could be expected to arise from the free avail-
ability of RGTs targeting height, immune system traits
and certain cognitive capacities. We then examined
45 McMahan, op. cit. note 41.
46 Parfit, op. cit. note 44, p. 171.
47 K. Jenni & G. Loewenstein. Explaining the Identifiable Victim
Effect. J Risk Uncertain 1997; 14: 235–257.
48 N. Daniels. Reasonable Disagreement about Identifed vs. Statistical
Victims. Hastings Cent Rep 2012; 42: 35–45.
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whether the risk of these problems could in principle
justify state intervention in a genetic supermarket. First,
we noted that there is a plausible prima facie case for the
view that such interventions could be justified, and
second, we responded to a number of arguments that
might be adduced against that view. We do not claim to
have provided knock-down objections to each of these
arguments. However, we hope that our discussion has
cast significant doubt on them. It is possible that these
doubts could be overcome. However, we believe that, in
the meantime, it is reasonable to believe that concerns
about collective action problems could in principle justify
regulation of the genetic supermarket. We say ‘in princi-
ple’ because we may never have strong enough evidence
that a particular collective action problem will occur, or
will be serious enough, to warrant government interven-
tion. We have noted several areas in which it is plausible
that serious collective actions would occur, but that is
not to say that we have, or will have, robust and specific
evidence of the sort that might be necessary to justify
government intervention in relation to particular
RGTs.49
As stated in the introduction, there is disagreement
among proponents of liberal eugenics about exactly what
conditions justify state interference in the genetic super-
market. Ronald Bailey argues that ‘to the extent that new
biotechnologies need regulation, agencies should be
limited to deciding, as they have traditionally done, only
questions about safety and efficacy.’50 Bailey rejects the
notion that the state should intervene in the genetic
supermarket for reasons beyond the protection of indi-
viduals. John Harris accepts that the state could intervene
in the genetic supermarket for social reasons, but only to
prevent ‘real and present harms or dangers’; he takes this
to be a ‘high standard’.51
Jonathon Glover is less restrictive in his requirements
for state interference in the genetic supermarket. Glover
writes:
could leaving people free to choose genes for their
children at the genetic supermarket have serious social
costs? If so, we may need a regulated market, on a
European model. On this system, there would be no
state plan to change people’s genes or to improve the
gene pool, but there might be limitations on genetic
choices thought to be against the public interest.52
Allen Buchannan and co-authors endorse a similar
position when they say ‘society has good, if not conclu-
sive, reason to restrict the liberties of individuals if the
exercise of those liberties undermines a public good’.53
We believe the arguments presented in this article
support a framework for regulating RGTs that is more in
line with those proposed by Buchannan and Glover than
those proposed by Harris and Bailey. We have argued
that, in principle, it is legitimate for the state to intervene
in the genetic supermarket to prevent collective action
problems. The types of harms that collective action prob-
lems pose may not affect any identifiable individuals and
may not occur for several generations, meaning they may
not be considered legitimate grounds of state interfer-
ences in more restrictive liberal eugenic approaches. Nev-
ertheless, given the total risk of harm that may be posed
by collective action problems, we believe they would
potentially justify restrictions on parental choice in the
genetic supermarket.
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